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Abstract. Privacy by design will become a legal obligation in the Eu-
ropean Community if the Data Protection Regulation eventually gets
adopted. However, taking into account privacy requirements in the de-
sign of a system is a challenging task. We propose an approach based
on the specification of privacy architectures and focus on a key aspect of
privacy, data minimisation, and its tension with integrity requirements.
We illustrate our formal framework through a smart metering case study.
1 Introduction
The philosophy of privacy by design is that privacy should not be treated as an
afterthought but as a first-class requirement in the design of IT systems. Privacy
by design will become a legal obligation in the European Community if the Data
Protection Regulation [11] eventually gets adopted. However, from a technical
standpoint privacy by design is a challenging endeavour: first, privacy is a multi-
faceted notion stemming from a variety of principles1 which are generally not
defined very precisely; in addition, these requirements may be (or may seem to
be) in tension with other requirements such as functional requirements, ease of
use or performances. To implement these requirements, a wide array of privacy
enhancing technologies (PETs) are available2. Each of these techniques provides
different guarantees based on different assumptions and therefore is suitable in
different contexts. As a result, it is quite complex for a software engineer to make
informed choices among all these possibilities and to find the most appropriate
combination of techniques to solve his own requirements. Solutions have been
proposed in different application domains such as smart metering [14,29], pay-
as-you-drive [2,18], or location-based systems [20] but the next challenge in this
area is to go beyond individual cases and to establish sound foundations and
methodologies for privacy by design [9,33]. In this paper, we advocate the idea
that privacy by design should be addressed at the architectural level, because it
? The final publication is available at link.springer.com (URL not yet available).
1 These principles include collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use
limitation, security, openness, individual participation, accountability, etc.
2 For example homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proof, secure multi-party
computation, private information retrieval, anonymous credentials, anonymous com-
munication channels, etc.
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makes it possible to abstract away unnecessary details, and should be supported
by a formal model. The fact that not all aspects of privacy are susceptible to
formalisation is not a daunting obstacle to the use of formal methods for privacy
by design: the key issue is to be able to build appropriate models for the aspects
of privacy that are prone to formalisation and involve complex reasoning. Data
minimisation, which is one of the key principles of most privacy guidelines and
regulations, is precisely one of these aspects. Data minimisation stipulates that
the collection and processing of personal data should always be done with respect
to a particular purpose and the amount of data strictly limited to what is really
necessary to achieve the purpose [11].
In this paper, data minimisation requirements are expressed as properties
defining for each stakeholder the information that he is (or is not) allowed to
know. Data minimisation would not be so difficult to achieve if other, some-
times conflicting, requirements did not have to be met simultaneously. Another
common requirement, which we call “integrity” in the sequel, is the fact that
some stakeholders may require guarantees about the correctness of the result of
a computation. In fact, the tension between data minimisation and integrity is
one of the delicate issues to be solved in many systems involving personal data.
In Section 2 we propose a language to define privacy architectures. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce a logic for reasoning about architectures and show the
correctness and completeness of its axiomatisation. This axiomatisation is used
in Section 4 to prove that an example of smart metering architecture meets
the expected privacy and minimisation requirements. Section 5 discusses related
work and Section 6 outlines directions for further research.
2 Privacy Architectures
Many definitions of architectures have been proposed in the literature. In this
paper, we adopt a definition inspired by [4]3: The architecture of a system is the
set of structures needed to reason about the system, which comprise software and
hardware elements, relations among them and properties of both. The atomic
components of an architecture are coarse-grain entities such as modules, com-
ponents or connectors. In the context of privacy, the components are typically
the PETs themselves and the purpose of the architecture is their combination
to achieve the requirements of the system.
The meaning of the requirements considered here (minimisation and in-
tegrity) depends on the purpose of the data collection, which is equated to the
expected functionality of the system here. In the sequel, we assume that this
functionality is expressed as the computation of a set of equations4 Ω such that
Ω =
{
X˜ = T
}
with terms T defined as shown in Table 1. X˜ represents (poten-
tially indexed) variables and X simple variables (X ∈ Var), k index variables
3 This definition is a generalisation (to system architectures) of the definition of soft-
ware architectures proposed in [4].
4 Which is typically the case for systems involving integrity requirements.
(k ∈ Index), Cx constants (Cx ∈ Const), Ck index constants (Ck ∈ N5), F
functions (F ∈ Fun) and F (X) is the iterative application of function F to
the elements of the array denoted by X (e.g. sum of the elements of X if F is
equal to +). We assume that each array variable X represents an array of fixed
size Range(X).
T ::= X˜ | Cx | F (T1, . . . , Tn) | F (X)
X˜ ::= X | XK
K ::= k | Ck
Table 1. Term Language.
In the following subsections, we introduce our privacy architecture language
(Subsection 2.1) and its semantics (Subsection 2.2).
2.1 Privacy Architecture Language
We define an architecture as a set of components Ci, i ∈ [1, . . . , n] associated
with relations describing their capabilities. These capabilities depend on the set
of available PETs. For the purpose of this paper, we consider the architecture
language described in Table 2.
A ::= {R}
R ::=Hasi
(
X˜
)
| Receivei,j
(
{S}, {X˜}
)
|Computei
(
X˜ = T
)
| Checki ({Eq})
|VerifProofi (Pro) | VerifAttesti (Att)
|Spotchecki,j (Xk,Eq) | Trusti,j
S ::=Pro | Att Att ::=Attesti ({Eq})
Pro ::=Proofi ({P}) Eq ::=T1 Rel T2
P ::=Att | Eq Rel ::= = |< |> | ≤ |≥
Table 2. Privacy Architecture Language.
Subscripts i and j are component indexes and the notation {Z} is used
to define a set of terms of category Z. Hasi(X˜) expresses the fact that vari-
able X˜ is an input variable located at component Ci (e.g. sensor or meter) and
Receivei,j({S}, {X˜}) specifies that component Ci can receive from component
Cj messages consisting of a set of statements {S} and a set of variables {X˜}. A
statement can be either a proof of a set of properties P (denoted by Proofi ({P}))
or an attestation (denoted by Attesti({Eq})), that is to say a simple declaration
5 Set of natural numbers.
by a component Ci that properties Eq are true. A component can also compute
a variable defined by an equation X˜ = T (denoted by Computei(X˜ = T )), check
that a set of properties Eq holds (denoted by Checki ({Eq})), verify a proof of
a property Pro received from another component (denoted by VerifProofi (Pro)),
verify the origin of an attestation (denoted by VerifAttesti (Att)), or perform a
spotcheck. A spotcheck, which is denoted by Spotchecki,j(Xk,Eq), is the request
from a component Cj of a value Xk taken from array X and the verification that
this value satisfies property Eq. Primitive properties Eq are simple equations
on terms T . Last but not least, trust assumptions are expressed using Trusti,j
(meaning that component Ci trusts component Cj). In the sequel, we use Γ to
denote the set of architectures following the syntax of Table 2. Architectures
can also be defined using graphical representations. As an illustration, Figure 1
displays a simple architecture involving a meter M and the central server of a
provider P . The meter plays both the role of a sensor providing the input con-
sumption values (HasM (Const)) and the role of a secure element computing the
fee. Because the provider trusts the meter (TrustP,M ), it merely checks the certifi-
cate AttestM ({Fee = + (y) , yt = F (xt) , xt = S (Const)}) sent by the meter.
HasM (Cons)
ComputeM (Fee = §+ (y))
ComputeM (yt = F (xt))
ComputeM (xt = S (Const))
Meter M
VerifP
QaAttestM
QaY][ Fee = §+ (y) ,yt = F (xt) ,
xt = S (Const)
Z^
\
RbRb
Central Server of the Provider P
ReceiveP,M
QaY][AttestM
QaY][ Fee = §+ (y) ,yt = F (xt) ,
xt = S (Const)
Z^
\
RbZ^\ , {Fee}
Rb
TrustP,M
Fig. 1. Example of smart metering architecture.
Strictly speaking, we should introduce a notion of actor and a relationship
between actors and the components that are under their control but, for the
sake of brevity (and without loss of generality6), we do not distinguish between
components and actors here.
Architectures provide an abstract, high-level view of a system: for example,
we do not express at this level the particular method (for example, a zero-
knowledge proof protocol) used by a component to build a proof (Proofi ({P})) or
to verify it, or to check that another component has actually certified (attested)
a property (VerifAttesti (Att)). Another main departure from protocol specification
languages is that we do not have any specific ordering or notion of sequentiality
here, even though functional dependencies introduce implicit constraints in the
6 The fact that an actor controls several components can be expressed through a trust
relationship.
events of the system, as discussed below. The objective is to express and reason
about the main design choices rather than to cover all the development steps.
2.2 Privacy Architectures Semantics
The definition of the semantics of an architecture is based on its set of compat-
ible traces. A trace is a sequence of high-level events occurring in the system as
presented in Table 3. Events can be seen as instantiated relations of the archi-
tecture. For example, a Receivei,j
({S}, {X˜ : V }) event specifies the values V of
the variables X˜ received by Ci. Similarly, Spotchecki,j (XCk : V, {Eq}) specifies
the specific index Ck (member of N) chosen by Ci for the spotcheck and the
value V of XCk. All variable indexes occurring in events, except for variables
occurring in the properties of Receivei,j , VerifProofi , Verif
Attest
i , and Spotchecki,j ,
must belong to N.
θ ::=Seq()
 ::=Hasi
(
X˜ : V
)
| Receivei,j
(
{S}, {X˜ : V }
)
|Computei
(
X˜ = T
)
| Checki ({Eq})
|VerifProofi (Pro) | VerifAttesti (Att)
|Spotchecki,j (XCk : V, {Eq})
Table 3. Events and traces.
In the following, we consider only consistent architectures and consistent
traces. An architecture is said to be consistent if each variable can be computed
(or can be initially possessed, as expressed by Hasi) by a single component, a
component cannot receive a variable from different sources, a component com-
puting a variable or checking a property can receive or compute all the neces-
sary input variables (variables occuring in T for Computei(X˜ = T ), in Eq for
Checki(Eq)), a component can only verify properties that it can receive from
another component, etc. The same kind of consistency assumptions apply to
traces, in addition to ordering consistency properties (variables and properties
are not used before being received or computed).
We use Event to denote the set of events  and Trace to denote the set of
consistent traces θ.
Definition 1 (Compatibility). A trace θ of length θ is compatible with an
architecture A if and only if:
∀a ∈ [1, θ], if θa 6= Computei
(
X˜ = T
)
then ∃α ∈ A, C(θa, α) and
if θa = Spotchecki,j (XCk : V, {Eq})
then ∀b ∈ [1, θ], b 6= a⇒ ∀k′, V ′, Eq′,
θb 6= Spotchecki,j
(
Xk′ : V ′, {Eq′}
)
where C(, α) holds if and only if  can be obtained from α by adding specific
values V for variables and instantiating index variables to integer values.
The first condition in the definition of compatibility states that, except for
compute events, only events which are instantiations of components of the archi-
tecture A can appear in the trace θ. The rationale for excepting compute events
is the need to express the potential actions of a curious agent trying to derive the
value of a variable X˜ from the values of variables that he already has. As a result,
compatible traces may include computations that are not contemplated by the
architecture, provided that the component possesses all the variables necessary
to perform this computation (consistency assumption). The adversary model
considered here includes computation of new variables, erroneous computations,
and communication of incorrect values, which corresponds to Dolev-Yao attacks
for internal stakeholders (except they cannot break the protocol). The second
condition expresses the fact that spotchecks can be performed only once. This
condition could be relaxed through the introduction of an additional threshold
parameter t to express the fact that up to t spotchecks are possible. We denote
by T (A) the set of compatible traces of an architecture A.
In order to define the semantics of events, we introduce first the notion of
state of a component:
State = (StateV × StateP × StateP ) ∪ {Error}
StateV = (Var→ Val⊥)
StateP = {{Eq} ∪ {Trusti,j}}
The state of a component is either the error state Error or a triple made of
a variable state assigning a value (or the undefined value ⊥7) to each variable
and two property states: the first one defines the set of properties known by the
component and the second one the set of properties believed by the component
(after a spotcheck). In the sequel, we use σ to denote the global state (state of the
components 〈C1, . . . , Cn〉) defined on Staten. The initial state for an architecture
A is denoted by InitA = 〈InitA1 , . . . , InitAn 〉 with:
∀i ∈ [1, n], InitAi = (Empty, {Trusti,j |Trusti,j ∈ A}, ∅)
where Empty denotes the empty variable state (∀X ∈ Var,Empty(X) = ⊥). The
only information contained in the initial state is the trust properties specified
by the architecture.
The semantics function ST is defined in Table 4. It specifies the impact of a
trace on the state of each component Ci. It is defined as an iteration through the
trace with function SE defining the impact of each type of event on the states
of the components.
The notation .θ is used to denote a trace whose first element is  and the
rest of the trace is θ. Each event modifies only the state of the component Ci.
7 Please note that ⊥ is used to denote undefined values, that is to say values which
have not been set, as opposed to error values (e.g. division by zero or type errors).
We do not consider computation error values here.
ST : Trace × Staten → Staten
SE : Event × Staten → Staten
ST (〈〉, σ) = σ
ST (.θ, σ) = ST (θ, SE(, σ))
SE
(
Hasi
(
X˜ : V
)
, σ
)
= σ[σi/(σvi [X˜/V ], σpki , σ
pb
i )]
SE
(
Receivei,j
(
{S}, {X˜ : V }
)
, σ
)
= σ[σi/(σvi [{X˜/V }], σpki , σpbi )]
SE
(
Computei
(
X˜ = T
)
, σ
)
= σ[σi/(σvi [X˜/ε(T, σvi )], σpki ∪ {X˜ = T}, σpbi )]
SE (Checki (E) , σ) = σ[σi/(σvi , σpki ∪ E, σpbi )]
if ∀Eq ∈ E, ε(Eq, σvi ) = True
= σ[σi/Error] otherwise
SE
(
VerifProofi
(
Proofj(E)
)
, σ
)
= σ[σi/(σvi , σpki ∪ {Eq|Eq ∈ E or
(Attestj′(E′) ∈ E and
Eq ∈ E′ and
Trusti,j′ ∈ σpki )}, σpbi )]
if VerifProof((E) , σvi ) = True
= σ[σi/Error] otherwise
SE
(
VerifAttesti (Attestj(E)) , σ
)
= σ[σi/(σvi , σpki ∪ {Eq|Eq ∈ E and
Trusti,j ∈ σpki }, σpbi )]
if VerifAttest((E) , σvi ) = True
= σ[σi/Error] otherwise
SE
(
Spotchecki,j (XCk : V,E) , σ
)
= σ[σi/(σvi [XCk/V ], σpki , σ
pb
i ∪ E)]
if ∀Eq ∈ E,
ε(Eq[k/Ck], σvi [XCk/V ]) = True
= σ[σi/Error] otherwise
Table 4. Semantics of traces of events.
This modification is expressed as σ[σi/(v, pk, pb)] (or σ[σi/Error] in the case of
the error state) that replaces the variable and property components of the state
of Ci by v, pk, and pb respectively. We assume that no event θa′ with a′ > a
involves component Ci if its state σi is equal to Error after the occurrence of θa
(in other words, any error in the execution of a component causes this component
to stop).
The effect of Hasi and Receivei,j on the variable state of component Ci is
the replacement of the values of the variables X˜ by new values V ∈ Val, which
is denoted by σvi [X˜/V ].
The effect of Computei(X˜ = T ) is to set the variable X˜ to the evaluation of
the value of T in the current variable state σvi of Ci, which is defined by ε(T, σvi ).
Spotchecki(XCk : V,E) sets the value of XCk to V . The other events do not have
any effect on the variable state of Ci. The value of a variable replaced after the
occurrence of an event must be ⊥ before its occurrence8. We assume that it is
different from ⊥ and does not involve any ⊥) after the event9.
Most events also have an effect on the property states. This effect is the
addition to the property states of the new knowledge or belief provided by the
event. For Computei
(
X˜ = T
)
, this new knowledge is the equality X˜ = T ; for
the Checki, Verifi, and Spotchecki,j events, the new knowledge is the properties
checked or verified. In all cases except for Spotchecki,j these properties are added
to the pk property state because they are known to be true by component Ci;
in the case of Spotchecki,j the properties are added to the pb property state
because they are believed by Ci: they have been checked on a sample value XCk
but might still be false for some other Xk. The only guarantee provided to Ci
by Spotchecki,j is that Ci has always the possibility to detect an error (but he
has to choose an appropriate index, that is to say an index that will reveal the
error).
Functions VerifProof and VerifAttest define the semantics of the corresponding
verification operations. As discussed above, we do not enter into the internals of
the proof and attestation verifications here and just assume that only true prop-
erties are accepted by VerifProof and only attestations provided by the authentic
sender are accepted by VerifAttest. The distinctive feature of VerifAttesti events is
that they generate new knowledge only if the author of the attestation can be
trusted (hence the Trusti,j ∈ A condition).
Let us note also that Receivei,j events do not add any new knowledge by
themselves because the received properties have to be verified before they can
be added to the property states.
We can now define the semantics of an architecture A as the set of the possible
states produced by compatible traces.
Definition 2 (Semantics of architectures.). The semantics of an architec-
ture A is defined as: S(A) = {σ ∈ Staten | ∃θ ∈ T (A), ST (θ, InitA) = σ}.
In the following, we use Si(A) to denote the subset of S(A) containing only
states which are well defined for component Ci: Si(A) = {σ ∈ S(A) |σi 6= Error}.
The prefix ordering on traces gives rise to the following ordering on states: ∀σ ∈
Si(A),∀σ′ ∈ Si(A), σ ≥i σ′ ⇔ ∃θ ∈ T (A),∃θ′ ∈ T (A), σ = ST (θ, InitA), σ′ =
ST (θ′, InitA), and θ′ is a prefix of θ.
8 Because we consider only consistent traces. A value different from ⊥ would mean
that the variable is computed or set more than once.
9 In other words, input values and results of computations are fully defined.
3 Privacy Logic
Because privacy is closely connected with the notion of knowledge, epistemic
logics form an ideal basis to reason about privacy properties. Epistemic logics [12]
are a family of modal logics using a knowledge modality usually denoted by
Ki (ψ) to denote the fact that agent i knows the property ψ. However standard
epistemic logics based on possible worlds semantics suffer from a weakness which
makes them unsuitable in the context of privacy: this problem is often referred
to as “logical omniscience” [17]. It stems from the fact that agents know all the
logical consequences of their knowledge (because these consequences hold in all
possible worlds). An undesirable outcome of logical omniscience would be that,
for example, an agent knowing the hash H (v) of a value v would also know
v. This is obviously not the intent in a formal model of privacy where hashes
are precisely used to hide the original values to the recipients. This issue is
related to the fact that standard epistemic logics do not account for limitations
of computational power.
Therefore it is necessary to define dedicated epistemic logics to deal with dif-
ferent aspects of privacy and to model the variety of notions at hand (e.g. knowl-
edge, zero-knowledge proof, trust, etc.). In this paper, we follow the “deductive
algorithmic knowledge” approach [12,28] in which the explicit knowledge of a
component Ci is defined as the knowledge that this component can actually com-
pute using his own deductive system .i. The deductive relation .i is defined here
as a relation between a set of Eq and Eq properties: {Eq1, . . . ,Eqn} .i Eq0. Typ-
ically, .i can be used to capture properties of the functions of the specification.
For example {h1 = H (x1) , h2 = H (x2) , h1 = h2}.i(x1 = x2) expresses the injec-
tivity property of a hash function H. Another relation, Depi, is introduced to ex-
press that a variable can be derived from other variables. Depi
(
X˜,
{
X˜1, . . . X˜n
})
means that a value for X˜ can be obtained by Ci (∃F, X˜ = F (X˜1, . . . , X˜n)). The
absence of a relation such as Depi (xk, {yk}) prevents component Ci from deriv-
ing the value of xk from the value of yk, capturing the hiding property of the
hash application yk = H (xk).
φ ::=Hasalli
(
X˜
)
|Hasnonei
(
X˜
)
|Hasonei
(
X˜
)
|Ki (Eq) |Bi (Eq) |φ1 ∧ φ2
Eq ::=T1 Rel T2 | Eq1 ∧ Eq2
Table 5. Architecture logic.
This logic involves two modalities, denoted by Ki and Bi, which represent
respectively knowledge and belief properties of a component Ci. Please note that
the Eq notation (already used in the language of architectures) is overloaded,
without ambiguity: it is used to denote conjunctions (rather than sets) of prim-
itive relations in the logic. The logic can be used to express useful properties
of architectures: for example Hasalli (X˜) expresses the fact that component Ci
can obtain or derive (using its deductive system .i) the value of X˜k for all k
in Range(X). Hasonei (X˜) expresses the fact that component Ci can obtain or
derive the value of Xk for at most one k in Range(X). Finally, Hasnonei (X˜) is
the privacy property stating that Ci does not know any Xk value. It should be
noted that Hasi properties only inform on the fact that Ci can get or derive
some values for the variables but they do not bring any guarantee about the cor-
rectness of these values. Such guarantees can only be ensured through integrity
requirements, expressed using the Ki(Eq) and Bi(Eq) properties. Ki(Eq) means
that component Ci can establish the truthfulness of Eq while Bi(Eq) expresses
the fact that Ci may test this truthfulness, and therefore detect its falsehood or
believe that the property is true otherwise.
We can now define the semantics of a property φ.
Definition 3 (Semantics of properties). The semantics S(φ) of a property
φ is defined in Table 6 as the set of architectures meeting φ.
A ∈ S
(
Hasalli
(
X˜
))
⇔∃σ ∈ S(A), σvi (X˜) does not contain any ⊥
A ∈ S
(
Hasnonei
(
X˜
))
⇔∀σ ∈ S(A), σvi (X˜) = ⊥
A ∈ S
(
Hasonei
(
X˜
))
⇔∀σ ∈ S(A), σvi (X˜) = ⊥ ∨ (σvi (X˜) =< v1, . . . , vk > ∧
@(u, u′), u 6= u′ ∧ vu 6= ⊥∧
vu′ 6= ⊥)
A ∈ S (Ki (Eq)) ⇔∀σ′ ∈ Si(A), ∃σ ∈ Si(A), ∃Eq′, (σ ≥i σ′) ∧ (σpki .i Eq′)∧
(Eq′ ⇒ Eq)
A ∈ S (Bi (Eq)) ⇔∀σ′ ∈ Si(A), ∃σ ∈ Si(A), ∃Eq′1, ∃Eq′2, (σ ≥i σ′)∧
(σpbi .i Eq
′
1) ∧ (σpki .i Eq′2)∧((
Eq′1 ∧ Eq′2
)
⇒ Eq
)
A ∈ S (φ1 ∧ φ2) ⇔A ∈ S(φ1) ∧A ∈ S(φ2)
Table 6. Semantics of properties.
An architecture satisfies the Hasalli (X˜) property if and only if Ci may obtain
the full value of X˜ in at least one compatible execution trace whereas Hasnonei (X˜)
holds if and only if no execution trace can lead to a state in which Ci gets a
value of X˜ (or of any part of its content if X˜ is an array variable). Hasonei (X˜)
is true if and only if no execution trace can lead to a state in which Ci knows
more than one of the values of the array X˜. The validity of Ki(Eq) and Bi(Eq)
properties is defined with respect to correct execution traces (with respect to Ci)
since an incorrect trace leads to a state in which an error has been detected by
the component10. The condition σ ≥ σ′ is used to discard states corresponding
to incomplete traces in which the property Eq has not yet been established. As
discussed above, the capacity for a component Ci to derive new knowledge or
beliefs is defined by its deductive system .i.
10 This is a usual implicit assumption in protocol verification.
In order to reason about architectures and the knowledge of the components,
we introduce in Table 7 an axiomatisation of the logic presented in the previ-
ous section. The fact that an architecture A satisfies a property φ is denoted
by A ` φ. Axioms (H1-8) and (HNO) are related to properties Hasi while ax-
ioms (K1-5) and (K∧) are related to the knowledge of the components. Axioms
(B), (KB), and (B∧) handle the belief case. Finally, the remaining axioms are
structural axioms dealing with the conjunctive operator.
H1
Hasi
(
X˜
)
∈A
A ` Hasalli
(
X˜
) H2Receivei,j (S, E)∈A X˜ ∈ {E}
A ` Hasalli
(
X˜
)
H3
Computei
(
X˜ = T
)
∈A
A ` Hasalli
(
X˜
) H4Spotchecki,j (Xk,E) ∈ A
A ` Hasonei (X)
H5
Depi
(
X˜,
{
X˜1, . . . X˜n
})
for all l ∈ [1, n], A ` Hasalli
(
X˜l
)
A ` Hasalli
(
X˜
)
H6
None of the pre-conditions of H1, H2, H3, H4, or H5 holds for X or any Xk
A ` Hasnonei
(
X˜
)
H7
A ` Hasalli
(
X˜
)
A ` Hasalli (Xk)
for all k ∈ Range(X) HNOA ` Has
none
i
(
X˜
)
A ` Hasonei
(
X˜
)
H8
A ` Hasnonei
(
X˜
)
A ` Hasnonei (Xk)
for all k ∈ Range(X) K1Computei
(
X˜ = T
)
∈ A
A ` Ki(X˜ = T )
K3
VerifProofi
(
Proofj(E)
)
∈ A Eq ∈ E
A ` Ki(Eq)
K2
Checki (E) ∈ A Eq ∈ E
A ` Ki(Eq)
K4
VerifProofi
(
Proofj(E)
)
∈ A Attestk(E′) ∈ E Trusti,k ∈ A Eq ∈ E′
A ` Ki(Eq)
K5
VerifAttesti (Attestj(E)) ∈ A Trusti,j ∈ A Eq ∈ E
A ` Ki(Eq)
KB
A ` Ki(Eq)
A ` Bi(Eq)
K∧ A ` Ki(Eq1) A ` Ki(Eq2)
A ` Ki(Eq1 ∧ Eq2)
B
Spotchecki,j (Xk,E) ∈ A Eq ∈ E
A ` Bi(Eq)
K.
E .i Eq0 for all Eq ∈ E,A ` Ki(Eq)
A ` Ki(Eq0)
I∧ A ` φ1 A ` φ2
A ` φ1 ∧ φ2
B∧ A ` Bi(Eq1) A ` Bi(Eq2)
A ` Bi(Eq1 ∧ Eq2)
B.
E .i Eq0 for all Eq ∈ E,A ` Bi(Eq)
A ` Bi(Eq0)
Table 7. Axiomatics.
The axiomatics meets the following soundness, completeness, and decidability
properties.
Property 1 (Soundness). For all A in Γ, if A ` φ then A ∈ S (φ).
The soundness property can be proved by considering each rule in Table 7 in
turn and showing that the traces specified in Table 6 have the expected properties
(or that appropriate traces can be found in the case of Hasalli ).
Property 2 (Completeness). For all A in Γ, if A ∈ S (φ) then A ` φ.
Completeness can be proved by systematic inspection of the different cases
in Table 4 that can make a property φ true in the trace semantics.
Property 3 (Decidability). If the deductive systems .i are decidable, then the
axiomatics is decidable.
The intuition is that proofs can be stratified into proofs of Hasalli , Hasnonei ,
Hasonei ,Ki, and Bi successively, with proofs of properties not involving the deduc-
tive systems of the components first and those involving the deductive systems
of the components as the last step.
4 Smart Meter Case Study
One of the services provided by smart metering systems is the periodic billing of
an amount Fee based on the customers consumption Const for periods of time
t. The service Fee =
∑
t (F (S (Const))) (where F and S stand for pricing and
metering) is expressed as Ω = {Fee = + (y), yt = F (xt), xt = S(Const)}. We
provide the details for the provider only here but a similar approach could be
used for customers or other parties.
Architecture Goals. The architecture should enable the provider P to get
access to the global fee: A ` HasallP (Fee). However, he should not be able to get
access to the individual consumptions Const or to the intermediate variables x
and y since they are the results of easily inversible functions (typically F is a
mapping and S the identity): A ` HasnoneP (Cons) ∧ HasnoneP (x) ∧ HasnoneP (y).
Moreover, he should be convinced that the value provided for Fee is actually
correct: A ` KP (Fee = + (y) ∧ yt = F (xt) ∧ xt = S(Const)).
Architecture Design. The design of an architecture meeting the above goals is
described Figure 1. A strong constraint concerning the metering has to be taken
into account from the start: regulators generally require the data to be metered
by officially certified and tamper-resistant metrological devicesM : HasM (Cons),
ComputeM (xt = S (Const)), and AttestM (xt = S (Const)).
One option for the computation of the fee is to have it performed by the
meter: ComputeM (Fee = + (y)) and ComputeM (yt = F (xt)). The result of
this computation can then be sent to the provider along with the corresponding
attestation and the metering attestation through a ReceiveP,M ({Att} , {Fee})
primitive. Another architectural primitive VerifAttestP (Att) should be added to
convince the provider of the correctness of the computation (considering that
the provider trusts the meter TrustP,M ).
Finally, the dependance relations have to be defined to model the compu-
tational power of the components P and M (they both have the same here for
the sake of simplicity, noted Depi for i ∈ {P,M}). The relations are such that
(Fee, {yt}) ∈ Depi, (yt, {xt}) ∈ Depi, (xt, {yt}) ∈ Depi, (xt, {Const}) ∈ Depi,
and (Const, {xt}) ∈ Depi (only the summation is not inversible here and we
have (yt, {Fee}) /∈ Depi).
Application of the Axiomatics. Rules (H2) and (H6) allow us to prove
respectively that the provider gets a value for the global fee since it receives it
from the meter and that the consumption and the values of the intermediate
variables x and y are not disclosed. Applications of rules (K5) and (K∧) prove
that the correctness of the global fee is ensured thanks to the attestations and
the trust relation between the provider and the meter. As expected, (H2) and
(H3) prove that the meter has an access to the consumption data.
The solution chosen here for the sake of conciseness describes heavy meters
performing the billing computations (which is generally not the case). Moreover,
there is a direct link between the meter and the provider: the customer has to
trust the meter not to disclose too much data to the provider. This issue could
be solved by adding a proxy under the control of the customer which would
filter the communications between the provider and the meter. Other options
for smart metering such as [29] can be expressed in the same framework but
space considerations prevent us from presenting them here.
5 Related Work
This paper stands at the crossroads of three different areas: engineering privacy
by design, software architectures and protocols, and epistemic logics.
Several authors [16,19,22,26,32] have already pointed out the complexity of
“privacy engineering” as well as the “richness of the data space”[16] calling for the
development of more general and systematic methodologies for privacy by design.
As far as privacy mechanisms are concerned, [19,23] points out the complexity
of their implementation and the large number of options that designers have to
face. To address this issue and favor the adoption of these tools, [19] proposes a
number of guidelines for the design of compilers for secure computation and zero-
knowledge proofs whereas [13] provides a language and a compiler to perform
computations on private data by synthesising zero-knowledge protocols. In a
different context (designing information systems for the cloud), [24] also proposes
implementation techniques to make it easier for developers to take into account
privacy and security requirements.
Software architectures have been an active research topic for several decades
[31] but they are usually defined using purely graphical, informal means or within
semi-formal frameworks. Dedicated languages have been proposed to specify pri-
vacy properties [3,5,21,34] but the policies expressed in these languages are usu-
ally more fine-grained than the properties considered here because they are not
intended to be used at the architectural level. Similarly, process calculi such as
the applied pi-calculus [30] have been applied to define privacy protocols [8]. Be-
cause process calculi are general frameworks to model concurrent systems, they
are more powerful than dedicated frameworks. The downside is that protocols
in these languages are expressed at a lower level and the tasks of specifying
a protocol and its expected properties are more complex [25,27,6]. Again, the
main departure of the approach advocated in this paper with respect to this
trend of work is that we reason at the level of architectures, providing ways to
express properties without entering into the details of specific protocols that we
assume perfect. The work presented here is a follow-up of [1] which advocates
an approach based on formal models of privacy architectures. The framework
introduced in [22] includes an inference system to reason about the implemen-
tation of a “detectability property” similar to the integrity property considered
here. This framework makes it possible to prove that, in a given architecture, an
actor “A” can detect potential errors (or frauds) in the computation of a variable
“X”. The logical framework presented here can be seen as a generalisation of [22]
which does not include a logic for defining privacy and integrity properties.
Epistemic logics have been extensively studied [12]. A difficulty in this kind
of framework in a context where hiding functions are used is the problem known
as “logical omniscience”. Several ways to solve this difficulty have been pro-
posed [28,17,7]. Other works such as [15] also rely on deontic logics and focus on
the expression of policies and how they relate to database security or distributed
systems.
6 Directions for Further Work
The framework presented in this paper can be used to express in a formal way the
main architectural choices in the design of a system and to reason about them.
It also makes it possible to compare different options, based on the properties
that they comply with, which is of prime importance when privacy requirements
have to be reconciled with other, apparently conflicting requirements.
As stated above, the framework described here does not cover the full devel-
opment cycle: ongoing work addresses the mapping from the architecture level to
the protocol level to ensure that a given implementation, abstracted as an applied
pi-calculus protocol [30], is consistent with an architecture. Work is also ongoing
to integrate this formal framework into a more user-friendly, graphical, design
environment integrating a pre-defined design strategy. This strategy, which is
implemented as a succession of question-answer iterations, allows the designer
to find his way among all possible design options based on key decision factors
such as the trust assumptions between entities. The resulting architectures can
then be checked using the formal framework described here.
In this paper, we have focused on data minimisation and it should be clear
that the framework presented here does not address other privacy requirements
such as the purpose limitation or the deletion obligation. Indeed, privacy is a
multi-faceted notion that cannot be entirely captured within a single formal
framework. Another limitation of the approach is that it must be possible to
define the service (or “purpose”) as the result of a functional expression (e.g.
the computation of a fee in electronic toll pricing or smart metering). Thus the
approach does not help in situations such as social networks where the service
is just the display of the data (and its access based on a given privacy policy).
Last but not least, in this paper, follow a “logical” (or qualitative) approach, as
opposed to a quantitative approach to privacy and we do not consider the use
of auxiliary information. An avenue for further research in this area would be
to study the integration of quantitative measures of privacy (such as differential
privacy [10]) into the framework.
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